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Abstract 
Incidence Calculus and Dempster-Shafer Theory of 
Evidence are both theories to describe agents' de­
grees of belief in propositions, thus being appropri­
ate to represent uncertainty in reasoning systems. 
This paper presents a straightforward equivalence 
proof between some special cases of these theories. 
1 Introduction 
Incidence Calculus 11,2,6) and Dempster-Shafer The­
ory of Evidence 13,5,8) are two alternative theories to 
represent uncertain knowledge in reasoning systems. 
They present a series of similarities: 
1. Both of them have been proposed as extensions 
of the Bayesian approach. 
2. Both of them have proposed interval-based 
probability extensions. 
3. Both of them have considered a specific kind of 
uncertainty, the probability assignment on pos­
sible worlds 14]. 
The main difference between them is that Dempster­
Shaler Theory of Evidence extends Bayesian Theory 
by allowing pouible world& with. un.defin.ed probability 
metUuru, whereas Incidence Calculus does so by al­
lowing proposition.& with. un.defin.ed truth. tUsign.men.ts 
on possible worlds. 
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In this paper we present some equivalence proofs be­
tween these theories, when applied over finite propo­
sitional languages. This is made possible due to the 
results presented by Fagin and Halpern in 13], and 
the proofs are achievable through the use of a refor­
mulated version of Fagin and Halpern's probability 
s tructures. 
2 Preliminary Definitions 
2.1 Probability Space 
Following 13], a probability space is a tuple (S,x,�-£), 
where S is a sample space, x is a u-algebra of 81, 
and 1-' is a probability measure of x: 
1-': x -10, 1] such that 
1. 1-'(S) = 1 
2. �o£(Uf Xi) = E� �-£(Xi), X, E X pairwise dis­
joint 
(H x is finite, this last property turns to 
�o£(Xl u,X2) = �-£(XI) + �o£(X2), X1 n X2 = 0, 
X1,X2 ex 
and allows us to derive the following corollaries: 
(a) 1-'(-..X) = 1-�o£{X) 
1that ia, x ia a aet of aubeeta of S auch that S E x and x 
ia cloaed under complementation and countable union 
{b) �{0) = o, 
where 0 stands for the empty set) 
The probability measure is defined only on X, that is 
a subset of the power set 28 of S. It can be extended 
on 28 in a standard way, by defining the inner mea­
sure induced by � {�.): 
J.'· : 28 -+ [0, 1] 
�.(A)= sup{�(X): X� A, X E x},A E 28 
that, due to the codomain of the measure func­
tion and property 2., can be rewritten, for finite u­
algebras, as: 
�.{A)= �{U X : X� A, X Ex) 
Given a u-algebra x, the subset x' � x is called 
a basis of x iff all members of x' are disjoint and 
nonempty and x consists precisely of countable 
unions of members of x'· It is provable that if x 
is finite then it has a basis [3]. 
2.2 Propositional Language 
The language we are going to consider is a finite 
propositional language. It can be characterised by a 
finite set of primitive propositions • = {Pt. ... , Pn} 
and its closure under the application of the Boolean 
operators A and -.. The primitive propositions in 
• do not necessarily describe mutually exclusive 
events. In order to have mutually exclusive events, 
�can be restated as the set At= {61, ... , � .. },where 
c5, = P� A ... A p� and Pi = P; or Pi = -.p;. H we 
define the operator V in terms of A and -. as usual, 
then we can associate subsets IP of At with formulae 
in the propoeitional language generated by •. con­
sisted by the disjunction of the elements of 'P· 2At 
represents all the formulae generated by�. 
Fagin and Halpern [3J assumed that all the formulae 
generated by • had an interpretation, ie., allowed a 
truth assignment. We will assume that a 0'-algebra 
1/J of At has interpretations. Since 2At is a 0'-algebra 
of At, our assumption includes Fagin and Halpern's 
one. 
Since • is finite, a 0'-algebra 1/J � 2At of At will be 
a set such that: 
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1.0E1/J . 
2. AtE 1/J 
3. r.p E 1/J -<::> -.r.p E 1/J 
4. 'Pl1'P2 E 1/J => {'Pl A 'P2) E 1/J 
5. 'Pl•'P2 E 1/J => {'Pl V 'P2) E 1/J 
3 Probability Structure 
In [3J a probability structure is defined as a tuple 
(S, x, �. 1r) , associated with a finite propositional 
language At. (S,x.�) is a probability space and 1r 
is a truth-assignment mapping, that associates with 
each s E S a mapping 1r(s) : • - {true,false}. 
Intuitively, each s corresponds to a possible world. 
Alternatively, we define an incidence mapping i as 
a specific formulation of the inverse mapping of 11", 
that is: 
with the following properties: 
1. i{IP) = {s E S: IP is true ins} 
2. i{0) = 0 
3. i(At) = S 
4. i(-.IP) = S -i(IP) 
s. i(IPt "'P2) = i('Pt) ni('P2) 
6. i(tpl VfP:z)=i(IPi}Ui(rp2) 
Thus, we restate a probability 3tructure as a tu­
ple (S,x.�,At,,P,i), where (S,x,�) is a probability 
space, At defines a propositional language, 1/J is a 
u-algebra of At and i is an incidence mapping. 
4 Dempster-Shafer Structure 
Given a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
atomic events, Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence 
provides a way to attach degrees of belief on these 
events by defining belief and plausibility functions. 
We can formalise these concepts aa tuples (9, bel), 
where e ia the set of atomic events and bel is the 
belief function o"er a, that is: 
I 
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bel: 2e - [0, 1] such that 
1. bel{0) = 0 
2. bel( 9) = 1 
3. bel(U� Ai) 
L:rs;; {l, ... ,s. },r¢0 ( -1)1II+lbel(n,er Ai), 
> 
where I I I stands for the cardinality of I 
Observe that the right-hand side of property .3. cor­
responds to the inclusion-exclusion rule for probabil­
ities [3,7]. 
The associated plau8ibility junction over 9 derives 
from the definition of the belief function: 
plb : ze - [o, 1] 
plb(A) = 1- bel( -,A) 
(that is, plb(0) = 1, plb(9) = 0, 
plb(U� .A,) =:;; 
1- L:r£{l, ... ,s.},r¢e(-1)rrl+lbel( f\er ..,A.) 
Thus, to each event A we can associate a subset of 
9 and attach an interval [bel,(A),plb.(.A.)J to which 
the probability of A belongs, where belt is the inf of 
bel and plb. is the sup of plb. 
In [3], a specific interpretation for Dempster-Shafer 
Theory of Evidence is provided. The set 9 is in­
terpreted as a set of possible worlds, to which the 
truth-evaluation of a finite propositional language is 
associated. In that case, it is proved that to any tu­
ple (9, bel) there is another tuple (8', bel'), in which 
9' is finite and the evaluations of bel' and bel are 
equal for any formula in the associated propositional 
language. It is also proved that to any tuple (8, bel) 
in which 8 is finite there is a corresponding probr 
bility structure {S, x, �-'• At, 2Ai, i) in which the eval­
uations of bel and �-'• are equal for any formula, pr0o 
vided that the propositional language is the same. 
It is worth observing that S is also finite, in that 
case. 
Thus, if we restrict our attention to Fagin and 
Halpern's interpretation and finite propoeitional lan­
guages, we can take Demp6ter-Shafer structuru as 
probability structures ( S, x, �-'• At, 2At, i), in which 
bel is the inner measnre induced by 14 and S is fi­
nite. 
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We define Total Dempder-Sh.afer structure$ as tu­
ples (S, x, JJ, At, 2At, i) in which the image of the in­
cidence mapping contains the u-algebra of the prob­
ability structure, that is, for all X E x there is a 
tp E zAt such that i(rp) = X. In other words, Total 
Dempster-Shafer structures guarantee that all the 
measurable sets of possible worlds refer to some for­
mula in the propositional language under consider­
ation. 
5 Incidence Calculus Struc­
ture 
Incidence Calculus [1,2,6] was proposed as an alter­
native way to attach and propagate degrees of belief 
on propositions. Here we have, as before, a set S 
of possible worlds, a probability measure associated 
with sets of possible worlds and an incidence map­
ping from propositions of a propositional language 
to possible worlds. 
Differently from before, though, the probability 
measure is defined on the whole power set 28 of 
S - and the incidence mapping is defined only on 
a generic 0'-algebra of atomic propositions. These 
concepts are captured by the probability structure 
(S, 25, �-'• At, ,P, i), where the symbols are defined as 
before. 
The inference rules in the Legal Assignment Finder 
procedure [1,2] extend the incidence mapping on all 
formulae, by determining the sets of possible worlds 
that would contain and the ones that would be con­
tained by those in which the formulae are true. That 
is, the incidence mapping is extended to lower and 
upper evaluations as follows (respectively, i. and i*): 
i.(e) = U[i(rp) = tp � e. tp e t/Jl 
i*(e) = s- Uli(rp) = tp � ...,e, tp e ,pJ = s- i.(e). 
The probability of a formula e is then de­
fined, in general, as belonging to the interval 
[JJ(i. (en, JJ(i* (en J .  
6 Equivalence Relations Be­
tween Dempster-Shafer and 
Incidence Calculus Struc­
tures 
Two probability structures (St,Xl d-'1 1 Atl,tP11 il} 
and {S2, X2, 1"21 At2, t/12, i2) are said to be equiva­
lent with rupect to a propositional language At iff 
At � At1, At � Atz and they define the same prob­
ability interval for every formula in 2At. 
There is a correspondence between Total Dempster­
Shafer structures and Incidence Calculus structures 
- that is, there is an association of an equivalent 
Total Dempster-Shafer structure to each Incidence 
Calculus structure, and vice-versa. Intuitively, it 
means that {Incidence Calculus) probability bound­
aries over propositions can be "translated" into 
{Dempster-Shafer) proability boundaries over pos­
sible worlds and vice-versa. Formally, these state­
ments can be presented and proved as below: 
Theorem 6.1 
For every Incidence Calculus Probabil­
ity Structure there iiJ an equivalent Total 
Dempater-Shafer Probability Structure. 
Proof: Given any Incidence Calculus structure 
(S, 25, p, At, t/J, i), we define a Total Dempster­
Shafer structure (At,t/J,JJ.u,At,2'u,i.u), where 
JJ<t,(�) = J.'(i(�)) ,  and id, is an identity function. 
Then we have that 
J.'{i.(€)) = J.'(U��>: lp s; e,lp E t/J) = J.'ct.(U��>: I(J s; 
id,(e),�p e t/J) = bel(€) 
l"(i*(e)} = J.'(s- U'P = I(J s; ...,e,I(J e t/J) = l"(s)­
J.'(U 10 = 10 � -.e, 10 e t/JJ = 
= 1- J.'(i.(-.e)) = 1- bel(...,€) = plb(€). 
QED 
Theorem 6.2 
For every Total Dempater-Shafer Prob­
ability Structure there is an equivalent In­
cidence CGlculuiJ Probability Structure. 
Proof: Given a Total Dempster-Shafer structure 
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(S, x, 1£1 At, 2At, i) we define an Incidence Calculus 
structure (Sic• zs;., J.'ic, At, tPic, iic), where S;c = x', 
J.'ic = JJ, 1P:c = {{S,} : i(c,) E Sic1 Ci E At}, and 
iic(IO) = i(IO), 10 E tPic· 
Then we have that 
bel(e) = J.'(U X :  X s; i(e ), X Ex)= J.'(U(i(cp)): 
i ( <p) � i (e), i ( <p) E X) = 
= P(U(i(<p)): <p s; e,i(<p) ex) = JJ(U(i(<p)) : <p � 
e, 'P E tPic) = 
= I"(U(i,c(IP)) : <p � e, <p E tPic) = J.'ic(U(i,c(cp)) : 
10 s; e,<p E tP;c) = 
= Jlic(i;c(U <p: <p s; e. <p E tPic)) = J.'ic(i.(e)) 
plb(e) = 1- bel (-.e ) = 1- J.'ic(i.(-,e)) = JJ,.,(S) -
1-'ic(i.(-,e)) = 
= J4.,(s -i.(-.e)) = 1-'ic(i*(-.e)). 
QED 
7 Example 
As an example, one problem is solved by using equiv­
alent structures belonging to each theory. The prob­
lem is the one presented in [3] - example 2.2, and 
stated here as follows: 
A person has four coats: two are 
blue and single-breasted, one is grey and 
double-breasted and one is grey and single­
breasted. To choose which color of coat 
this penon is going to wear, one tosses 
a (fair} coin. Once the colour is chosen, 
to choose which specific coat to wear the 
person uses a mysterious nondeterministic 
procedure which we don't know anything 
about . What is the probability of the per­
son wearing a single-breasted coat? 
7.1 Deinpster-Shafer Solution 
Let S.u = {s1, 1J21 ss, -'4}, where -'1 and sz corre­
spond to the wearing of blue coats, -'s corresponds 
to the wearing of the grey single-breasted coat a.nd 
s4 corresponds to the wearing of the grey double­
breasted one. 
Let � = {g, d}, corresponding respectively to "the 
coat is grey• and "the coat is double-breasted". 
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Then we have 
At= {g 1\ d, -.gAd, -.g A -.d, g A -.d}, 
Xd• = {{sl,s2},{s3,s4},0,Sd,}, 
J.l({sl,s2}) = J.l({ss,s4}) = 0.5, J-�(0}) = 
O,J.I({S}) = 1. 
Observe that this structure is total. 
The desired answer, 
is undefined. The lower and upper bounds for this 
value are: 
bel(-.d) = J.l•(i(-.d)) = J.1.({sl,s2,ss}) = 
J.l({sl,s2}) = 0.5, 
plb(-.d) = 1-J.�.(i(d)) = l-J.�.({s4}) = l-J-�(0) = 1. 
It means that, although we have no means to eval­
uate the probability of the person to wear a single­
breasted coat, we know that it is not smaller than 
0.5. 
'T .2 Incidence Calculus Solution 
To solve the same problem using Incidence Calcu­
lus, instead of constructing a set of possible worlds 
- some of which being nonmeasurable - with each 
one corresponding to one possible situation, we con­
struct a. set of possible worlda with each one corre­
sponding to one me�Uurc&ble situation, that may be a 
set of subsets of the formerly considered situations. 
For example, let's construct an Incidence Calculus 
structure by applying the procedure pointed out in 
Theorem 6.2 on the formulation of section 7.1: 
Let Sie = { w11 w2}, where W1 and w2 correspond 
to the possible worlds in which the blue and grey 
coats are worn, respectively. This is the basis of Xd• 
(w1 = {s1 , -'2},W2 = {ss, ""}). 
Let 4l and At be a.s before. Now, 
2S;c = {0, { wl}, { W2}1 S;c}, 
1/J:e = {0, -.g 1\ d, -.g 1\ -.d, (g 1\ -.d) V (g 1\ d), (-.g 1\ 
-.d) v (-.g 1\ d), (-.g 1\ d) v (g 1\ -.d) v (g 1\ d), (-.g 1\ 
-.d) v (g 1\ -.d) v (g 1\ cl) I At}' 
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and J.l({wl}) = J.l({w2}) = 0.5, J-�(0}) = O,J.I({S}) = 
1. 
The desired answer, J.l(i(-.d)) = J.l(i((-.g 1\ -.d) V (g 1\ 
-.d))) is undefined because i ( ( -.g 1\ -.d) V (g 1\ -.d)) is 
undefined. We have that: 
J.l(i.(-.d)) = J.l(i(....,g 1\ -.d)) = J.l({sl}) = 0.5, 
J.l(i*(-.d)) = 1- J.l(i(...,g" d))= 1- J-�(0) = 1 
and we find the same values as before. 
8 Conclusion 
Work 
and Further 
We have shown that there is an equivalence relation 
between Total Dempster-Shafer structures and In­
cidence Calculus structures for finite propositional 
languages. 
Apart from the proof of equivalence itself, this re­
sult makes it possible to restate problems with in­
complete information about probabilities on possi­
ble worlds as problems with partial truth-assignment 
functions on formulae and vice-versa, what can be 
useful in a knowledge-base design process for pro­
viding different views of one problem, thus helping 
the expert to explicitate his knowledge. 
Further work includes the analysis of the formal re­
lationship between Incidence Calculus as presented 
here and a.s in the original papers [1,2] - specifi­
cally, we must prove that the reconstruction pre­
sented here corresponds with the rules of inference 
in the Legal Assignment Finder procedure [1,2]- and 
attempting to drop the restrictions of finiteness of 
the propositional language and "totalness" of the 
Dempster-Shafer structure. 
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